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the formulation of clear and unequivocal guiding principles, particularly when we come to deal with the distinction between interstate
there
and intrastate commerce. Modem business is.so organized that
and one
are many breaks and stoppages in the shipment of goods, when inof the most difficult problems is the determination of just
that the charterruptions in the shipment so break its legal continuity determined,
separately
be
must
movements
component
acter of the
one conon the one hand, and when the whole must be considered. When
other.
the
on
stoppage
the
notwithstanding
tinuous movement
be examined
the statement of a rule is essayed, therefore, it should
cases.
past
of
light
the
in
carefully
In a case in which this was recently done, the Standard Oil aComseapany maintained storage tanks at Wilmington, North Carolina,
own
its
on
states,
other
in
refineries
its
from
port, to which it shipped
North
ships, all the oil and gasoline intended for consumption in by the
sold
was
gasoline
and
oil
this
of
cent.
Carolina. Ninety per
residue
company's own filling stations throughout the state, and the
by
supplied
was
district
adjoining
The
by independent retailers.
was found
trucks and the remoter sections by railroad tank cars. Itoil or gasoas a fact that the ultimate destinatiod'of each shipload of
line was not determined until after it had arrived at Wilmington.
to points
The court decided that the rail shipments from Wilmington
in
interruption
An
rates.within the state were subject to intrastate
necessitated
court,
the
of
language
the
paraphrase
to
the shipment,
solely by the peculiar exigencies of the particular type of transportamovement;
tion selected, will not break the legal continuity of thepass into the
goods
the
and
fide,
but if such interruption be bona
of his
possession and control of the consignee or owner for purposes
and
broken
is
movement
the
of
own business, the legal continuity
insuch
preceding,
and
to,
subsequent
shipments
the
of
the character
separate
their
to
according
determined
terruption must be separately
facts.
Assuming the soundness of this principle, many hitherto troubleof these
some cases can be dismissed with a word or two. Some
owner's
the
of
purposes
for
interruption
an
present a clear case of
a circus is detrained at intervals in order to
business. Thus, where
2
manustage performances, or where rough timber is unloaded to be 3 the
factured into barrel staves, after which the journey is resumed, are
movements are distinct. Other cases illustrate interruptions which ibe
clearly incidents of transportation. Shipments must . frequently
(D. C.,
'Standard Oil Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 6 Fed. (2d) 912
1925).
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delayed at a seaport in order to obtain a full cargo, to await the arrival of the carrier engaged, or merely for the purpose of transfer
from rail to water. s Logs being driven down a stream may be halted
in their course by low water,' or detained by a boom in order to preserve them during excessively high water.' Sheep on a long journey
must be halted to graze and to rest.' Such interruptions are all
incidental and necessary to the transportation, and the court logically
held the legal continuity of the movement unbroken and the entire
journey interstate commerce. That view is of more doubtful propriety where raw cotton is halted after the initial short leg of the
journey and compressed into bales, by the carrier, according to its
usual custom, to insure more convenient handling during the longer
final leg of the journey,' or where coal is weighed, inspected and
billed to its final destination, at scales en route, ten miles distant from
the mines,10 though perhaps both cases may be said to be fairly within
the rule.
A more difficult problem is raised, however, in the application
of this principle to the facts of the instant decision. In cases of this
type, it seems. to be important whether the ultimate destination of the
article is determined before it reaches the point of interruption or
afterwards. If before, then the delay is merely that usually necessitated by the transfer from one. carrier to another, perhaps because
the next carrier is not immediately available, or, if from rail to water,
because a full cargo has not yet been obtained, or simply because of
the time-lost in unloading and reloading. These interruptions are
incidental and necessary to the transportation, and should not break
the legal continuity of the movement. But if the ultimate destination
of the article is determined after it reaches the point of interruption,
then the consignor is obviously using this point as a place of storage
for his goods and the delay is occasioned for purposes of the owner's
business. And there is apparently no sound distinction between cases
where the movement between points in the same state is the initial,
and those where it is the final, leg of the journey. The interruption is
just as much for purposes of the owner's business in the one as in the
other. It is true that the principal case does not fall exactly within
the so,.. '- 2roup. The policy of the consignor seems to have been
to make shipments to the point of interruption in anticipation of the
market demands, and to handle its orders and to make the final bill' Louisiana R. R. Comm. v. Texas & Pacific R. R., 229 U. S. 336 (ixgr).
'Texas, etc., R. R. v. Sabine Tram. Co., 227 U. S. 1i1 (x112).
'See Coe v. Errol, IX6 U. S. 517, 525 (1885).
'Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 26o U. S. 366 (z922).
'Kelly v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. i (xgoa).
*McFadden v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 241 Fed. 562 (C. C. A,

1917).

"Phila. & R. R. R. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284 (i919). This case is not
clear in its statement of facts as to whether the scales were owned and operated by the railroad or by the mining company.
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ings from that point. Occasionally the ultimate destination might
be determined before the goods reached the point of interruption, if
the trend of the market had been accurately foreseen. But such a
condition would be entirely fortuitous, and should not be enough to
alter the classification. Under normal conditions, the interruption
was for purposes of the owner's business.
Considered by itself, therefore, the application of the rule to the
facts of the princiual case seems quite sound and logical in its result.
But it is of interest to compare this decision with those in two related
types of cases which, for the sake of convenience, will be called Case
In Case 2, the initial leg of the journey, between
2 and Case 3.
points in the same state, is by rail, and the tariff regulations of the
carrier provide that the goods may be retained indefinitely in the cars
and on the tracks of the railroad company at its terminal, subject
to the order of the shipper, and that, if a further shipment be made
thence to a point outside the state, the-initial movement of the goods
shall be subject to the through, as opposed to the local, freight rate.
In Case 3, raw materials are shipped from the source of supply to a
factory in the same state, there prepared for the -market, and forwarded thence to a consumer in another state, the tariff regulations
of the carrier providing that the two separate shipments shall be considered one continuous movement and subject to a through freight
rate. While the United States Supreme Court has apparently not
committed itself absolutely as to Case 3,11 it has held the initial'ship'McFadden v. Alabama Great Southern R. R., supra, note 9, was apparently decided on the ground that the stoppage and Qe compression of the cotton into bales were provided for by the tariff regulations of the carrier, but
this could be said to be incidental to the transportation. The cotton also remained in the possession of the carrier. In Central R. R. of N. J. v. United
States, 257 U. S. 247 (1921), the Interstate Commerce Commission had refused a petition to compel a carrier to allow to the petitioner a transit privilege similar to that in Case 3, tiz., timber to be shipped from forest to creosotig plant, there creosoted, and shipped thence to the consumer, the whole to be
considered one continuous movement subject to the through rate. The appeal
was dismissed because the refusal of the carrier to grant the transit privilege
was not shown to be unjustly discriminative under the Commerce Act, but the
validity of such transit privileges seems to have been assumed by the Court
though not specifically passed upon.
Southern Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 498 (igi), seems to present
a curious anomaly. A strip of land along the sea coast was obtained by a
Terminal Company under a state statute and a city ordinance stipulating that
the site be used as an auxiliary to the railroad terminal for transferring freight
from rail to water. A cotton seed exporter, under an agreement with the Terminal Company, reclaimed a bit of this land, then lying waste, built a mill there
for grinding cotton seed into meal, and thereby saved himself not only the expense of the double handlirg of the seed but also the terminal charges. His
competitors petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission to compel the Terminal Company to collect the usual terminal charges from him, notwithstanding, and the petition was granted. The jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission was questioned in the Supreme Court and the court held
that it had jurisdiction, but went further and said that the shipments of cotton
seed to this seaport from various points in the same state and the shipments of
the cotton meal from the seaport to foreign ports were continuous movements
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ment in Case 2 to be interstate commerce.11 It could be argued of
course in Case 2 that the carrier has not completed its contract until
it transfers the goods to the next carrier, and that the movement is
therefore continuous; but the obvious answer is that the carrier is
not carrying the goods but is storing them, and that such storage is
not incidental to the transportation, but simply for purposes of the
clear that the
consignor's business. In Case 3, however, it is quite
3
movement is continuous only by force of a fiction.'
Rightly or wrongly, the court in the priricipal case carefully stated the rule so as to exclude Case 2 from its operation," perhaps overlooking Case 3. Peculiar tariff provisions, such as those

in these two groups of cases, can be explained only in the light of
the development of our railroads, originating solely as ingenious
schemes on the part of the larger railroad companies to take business
away from the smaller competing lines, the through rate being allowed
only when both shipments were made over the same railroad. And
and foreign commerce from start to finish, even though the movement was interrupted at the seaport so that the seed could be ground into meal. And it
should also be noted that there was no tariff provision of a railroad covering the
interruption here as above. It is very difficult -to understand why the court
went so far unnecessarily. It would seem that the Interstate Commerce Commission obtained jurisdiction from the fact that the Terminal Company had
obligated itself to use the land for facilities auxiliary to foreign commerce,
and that alone, and that the character of the initial shipment of the cotton
seed to the seaport was wholly irrelevant. Even were the dictum sound and
the two shipments actually one continuous movement in foreign commerce, that
alone would hardly give the Commission jurisdiction,- since the petition was
directed against the Terminal Company and it had nothing to do with the
movement of the goods in question. Apparently the petitioners could prove
their case only by showing that the Terminal Company had obligated itself to
use the land for foreign commerce, and that its agreement with the exporter
was ultra zires. since it resulted in unjust discrimination in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. Nevertheless this case has been cited as an example
of a continuous movement.
" Ohio R. R. Comm. v. Worthington, 205 U. S. 1o (igii), is a good example under Case 2. Transportation is interrupted by the ice on the Great
Lakes during the winter season and under the stress of the competition between
the railroads for the freight traffic from the interior to the lake ports facilities
were provided at the lake terminals for storing certain commodities, such as
coal, in the cars and on the track: of the railroad company for indefinite periods
subject to the order of the shipper. Coal was thus shipped from the mines to
a lake port in the same state, halted there indefinitely, and later sent by water to
points outside the state of origin. The Court held the initial movement interstate commerce. Cf. Coe v. Errol, supra, note 6, where the owner of the goods
himself, as in the principal case, was the carrier, logs being carried from the
forest to a nearby river, stored in the river until the following spring, and then
driven down the river to a sawmill in another state. The Court held that this
interruption broke the legal continuity of the movement.
"See Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey v. U. S., supra, note 1i, p. 257.
" See statement of the rule, supra. It is to be noted that the court stipulated that "the goods pass into the possession and control of the consignor or
owner." In Case 2, the storage facilities are provided by the carrier, and the
goods remain in its possession, which would exclude that case from the operation of the rule as stated.
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the decisions holding the two separate and distinct shipments one
continuous movement and the whole interstate commerce seem to
encroach by means of fictions on the power of the several states to
regulate intrastate commerce. Whether such tariff provisions are so
firmly imbedded in our transportation system as to make it impossible to uproot them, or whether the additional control over cornmerce
thereby secured to the federal government is necessary for national
rate adjustments are wholly questions of economics and lie beyond
the scope of this note.
The rule laid down by the court, however, appears to be the
result of an honest and conscientious attempt to digest the past cases
having its seed in a scholarly review by
on the subject, very probably
1
Whether it will be expressly adopted by
Mr. Chief Justice Taft.
the higher federal courts and how much of the field it can comprehend are entirely matters of conjecture; but at first glance it does
seem to clear up a great many troublesome cases with the exceptions,
of course, above noted. Such attempts to formulate governing rules
will go far toward removing the difficulties which, in the past, have
characterized this field of constitutional law.
B.A.B.

EFFECT

OF TRAFFIC. SIGNALS

ON

RIGHTS AND

DUTIES

AT

STREET INTERSECTION s-When traffic signals are employed to reduce
the confusion of the continual contest between motorist and pedestrian, neither party is willing to cooperate in giving this device its
greatest efficiency. Each is convinced that it is legitimate to beat the
"stop" signal if he can, but he is equally certain that the "go" signal
gives him an absolute right of way. "Some automobile drivers
imagine," said the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently, "the
signal gives them a clear right of way against intersecting traffic."
Then the Court proceeds to explode this notion by holding in Gilles
v. Leas I that the driver may nevertheless be liable for any negligence towards pedestrians in the intersecting way. But hardly has
the pedestrian ceased congratulating himself on this victory over an
ancient enemy than comes a pronouncement of his own duty toward
the motorist. In Panitz v. Webb I it was recently held that though
the signal was with the pedestrian, it did not give him an absolute
right of way. The two cases together mark very clearly the limits
of the respective rights and duties of motorist and pedestrian under
modern complex city traffic conditions.
The cases present entirely different situations, in that one deals
with the obligations of the motorist, the other with those of the pedestrian. Yet, as will appear, they rest on the same fundamental principles. In Gilles v. Leas, a pedestrian had started to cross the street
'Champlain

Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, supra, note 7, PP. 375-377.

'282 Pa. 318, 127 At. 774 (1925).
'13o Ati. 913 (Md., 1925).
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with the traffic signal with him; when partly across, the semaphore
was turned and intersecting traffic was thus released; the defendant
ran down the pedestrian in the middle of the street on the opposite
crosswalk. It was held that the fact that the traffic signal was with
is
the defendant could not excuse him. The justice of the decision
clear, and there would seem to be little room for argument. Indeed,
conin the case in which this situation first appeared there was no duty
a
from
motorist
the
exempted
proceed
to
signal
the
that
tention
of care toward others using the streets. The court merely remarked:
"This attempted regulation, of course, neither placed nor released
And in Gilles v.
legal obligations of the plaintiff or defendant."
no hesitation
felt
court
the
contended,
was
point
the
which
in
Lcas,
of certainty
degree
equal
an
With
in coming to the same conclusion.
four other state courts have made the same decision, and with one
exception each decision was reached independently of the cases decided in the sister states.' Indeed, so sure have been the courts that
nethe answer was clear and the rule not novel, that they have rather Yet
glected to develop to any extent the reason for their holding.
the reason is as clear as the answer. It is all a matter of avoiding
the layman's confusion as to the true function of traffic signals: is
An examination of fundamental principles will show that it
well settled that there is no prior right of way at a crossing. Pedes-a
trians and motorists have it in common; and as a result there isthe
reciprocal duty of both to use care in crossing. Each has a duty:
pedestrian, realizing that vehicles have also a right to use the way, to
enter that way with a reasonable degree of caution for his own safety,
and to govern his actions accordingly; the driver, to anticipate the
possible presence of pedestrians and to exercise reasonable care that
he does rot injure them once he is aware of their presence. Apparently, then, each must look out for the other; apparently, also, each
may enter the roadway whenever he pleases provided he would not
be subjecting himself or others unreasonably to bodily danger. Traf'Foster v. Parmelee, 179 Ill. App. 21 (1913). The real issue in this case
was whether the evidence sustained a directed verdict. There was no contention as v. the effect of traffic signals.
v.
'In these cases the facts were the same as in Gilles v. Leas.v. Melville
Hennessey,
Walmer-Roberts
(ig96);
638
W.
S.
188
607,
Ky.
171
Rollwage.
Riddel v.
191 Iowa 86. 181 N. W. 798 (iqpn), citing Melville v. Rollwage; 186 Wis.
Lyon, 124 Wash. 146, 213 Pac. 487 (1923). In Barutio v. Dowling,
in that the pedestrian was
422, 2o2 N. XV. 687 (1925), the facts differed only
defendant'- automobile,
crossing on the crosswalk immediately in front of the
he was nu, ;;atching for
and not the oppos:te crosswalk. The defendant saidThe
Court said the driver
pedestrians but only watching the traffic officer.
highway in
must watch not nly the traffic officer but also the condition ofCf.the
also Croatian
front of him with respect to pedestrians and other vehicles.
a question of conPacking Co. v. Rice, 147 N. E. 288 (Ind., 1925), where on by
the signal being
tributory negligence it was held that one caught in traffic
turned against him when half way across is bound to act only as a reasonably
prudent man in endeavoring to extricate himself.
I See 5I L. R. A. (N. S.) 99o, roo, on the reciprocal duty of operator of
automobile and pedestrian to use care when approaching a crossing.
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fic signals, it would seem, regulate the time when a man or car may
enter the crossway. It does not follow, however, that they also regulate the manner in which the crossway should be used once it is entered. Certainly it is impracticable for the traffic officer to clear the
intersecting ways before allowing opposite traffic to move. But if
traffic is thus to be released before the pedestrian has had an opportunity to reach a refuge, clearly he must be protected, for no one
would claim that he must scurry to safety as best he can.without the
aid of proper protection frodi some source. As the practical operathe
tion of signals will not afford this protection, it devolves upon
motorist to supply it. Hence the solution is to hold the motorist, to
a degree of care in using the road which approximates that required
of him when there are no signals.' From the motorist's point of view,
spejust as "stop" means to come to a standstill, "go" means a way
cially prepared for him. But there is nothing about the signal to proceed that would lead any one to believe that such is its meaning. A
he
little thought should show the driver that "go" means merely that
signals
no
been
there
had
proceeded
have
would
he
as
may proceed
at all.
It is well settled that the driver favored, for some reason,' with
the right of way over another vehicle at a street intersection, is not
due care to avoid colliding with
relieved from the duty to exercise
8
rule could by analogy have
This
a vehicle disregarding that right.
Leas. This seems particuv.
Gilles
of
situation
the
to
applied
been
use of traffic signals might
the
that
larly true when it is remembered
be construed as nothing more than a method of indicating the right
To
of way. However, the courts do not depend upon the analogy.
had a superior right of
do so would involve deciding which party
9
only
way, and this was done in only one case, the other courts going
peso far as to say that if there is a superior right of way, it is the
traffic
when
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then,
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Traffic
is released the usual rules as to the duty to take care apply.
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supplant;
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not
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help,
to
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helped, but are caught during the change of signals, are not thereby
to be deprived of their rights.
The duty of the motorist has been'shown. That of the pedesto
trian is now to e considered. Like the motorist, he often seems
the
'The degree of care may well be the same. Yet, without so holding,

be relied upon and may
cases seem to indicate that to some extent signals may
reasonbe taken into consideration with other evidence in determining whether

able care was used, under the circumstances.
gives north and south
'As, for instance, where a statute or ordinance
the rule of the road is
where
or
traffic;
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over
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simultaneous arrival at
on
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of
right
the
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to
that the vehicle
intersections.
'Erwin v. Traud, go N. J. L. 289, ioo At. 184 (1917). See also notes
in 21 A. L R. 988; 37 A. L R. So9.
' Riddel v. Lyon, supra, note 4.
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imagine that a traffic signal gives him an absolute right of way. The

c'bb conclusively shows that it does not. In crosscase of Panit:v.
signal, the plaintiff was run down by aft automothe
with
ing a street
bile which started with the signal and made a right-hand turn into
that
the street which the plaintiff was crossing. The court charged
if the jury found that the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's
automobile while she was crossing the street, "when the semaphore
indicated 'go' to the plaintiff, they may find that she had the right
of way over the defendant." The effect of this charge was to give
a
the plaintiff an absolute right because of the signal. As there was
late
too
sidewalk
the
left
not
had
plaintiff
the
whether
conflict
sharp
for the defendant to be aware of her presence and to avoid striking
her even if lie were driving with the utmost care, the court's charge,
if erroneous, was clearly prejudicial. The Court of Appeals held
that it was erroneous. The plaintiff did not have an absolute right
all,
of way; the right is relative; and if she had the right of way at
"from
but
officer,
traffic
the
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direction
the
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alone
not
she had it
acthat in connection with other facts such as that- she had actually
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automobile, in such a position that the operator thereof should by
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the exercise of reasonable care have known of her peril in time
have avoided striking her."
Thus it would-seem that in this situation the pedestrian has no
more the right of way than has the motorist in Gilles v. Leas. The
releases the
signal to go does not give the right of way. It merely
prohibition on attempting to assume the right of way which was created by the stop signal. And so the pedestrian in going with the
sign must look out for traffic on the street. This was a case of a
motorist also proceeding with the signal. But on the reasoning there
seems to be no doubt that the pedestrian had a duty to look out for
vehicles still in the intersecting way because the signal was changed
before they could get across. And it has been held that even if it is
a driver's duty to stop on a traffic signal, it is still the pedestrian's
duty to use care, so that lie is not warranted in stepping in front of 10a
moving car when he could see that the driver was not going to stop.
Thus it would seem that though the situations of Gilles v. Leas
e'cbb arise differently, yet they are settled by the same
and Panit:v.
principle, that the pedestrian and motorist have reciprocal rights and
duties at crossings which do not cease to exist because of the use of
traffic signals. Only an unjustifiable misunderstanding of the true
function of traffic signals would lead anyone to think otherwise. When
it is recalle,l how often these situations must arise, the rarity of the
cases in which the opposite view is seriously urged shows that the
lawyers are clear on the subject; the admirable harmony of the cases,
reached almost without reference to each other, shows that the courts
refuse to be led astray; but even casual observation of the way in
"O'Brien v. Bieling, 267 Pa. 383,

1iO

Ad. 89 (1920).
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In the recent case of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Great Falls
Power Co., ' a canal company, through condemnation proceedings,
became the owner in fee of a strip of land bordering upon the Potomac River. The corporate charter provided that the canal should become -a public highway when. completed, but it was never completed,
of
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strip
canal
the
corporation,
defendant
provision of the charter of the
is an
question
The
highway.
public
a
of
status
the
attained
never
old one, although it cannot be said to be of merely academic interest.a
That the right of way of 'such a corporation is impressed with
states has been expublic use is generally recognized,' and in some
10
By reason of this
statute.
or
constitution
by
declared
so
pressly
public highways
other
and
streets
fact, the protection accorded to city
1
and PennsylCalifornia"
in
railroads,
to
extended
has been further
unusual, for
12
not
is
result
The
vania, in the absence of any statute.
for a
Congress
by
railroad
a
to
land
of
grant
a
that
it is well settled
The
possession.'
adverse
by
right of way cannot be extinguished
conits
and
purposes
all
for
fee
absolute
an
not
is
grant by Congress
ditions are not consistent with a right of an individual to title through
lose the land by indirection
adverse possession. The railroad cannot
14
In several jurisdictions, the
where it could not convey directly.
a129 S. E. 731 (Va-, 1925).
The early con'Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry., 135 U. S. 641 (i89o).
the public
which
upon
highway
improved
an
of
that
was
railroad
a
of
ception
etc., Co. v.
heir own cars or motive power. See Western N. Y.,
could :
A canal might
Buffalo, t.c-, R. R., 193 Pa. 27, 142, 44 Aft. 242, 243 (19o).
well be used at the present day in such a manner.
R. v. Chcago,
"Texas v. R. R., 283 Fed. 584 (D. C.. 1922) ; C. & N. LR.W.
R. Co., x6
City, etc., R. R. v.
140 Ill. 309. 29 N. E. 1109 (1892) ; Kan
Mo. 272, 19 S. W.

R. R., 11o
La. 178. 4o So. 627 (i9o5); Hyde v. Mo. Pac.
W. 928 (i9o3).
483 (1892); Lucas v. Ry., 67 Neb. 6o3, 93 N.
So. Pac. Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 24o, 64 Pac. 272 (i9ox).
v. P.
SConwdll v. P. & R. R. R., 240 Pa. 172, 88 Atl. 417 (1I3) ; Holmes
Where the railroad asserts public use to
S. C., 79 Pa. Super. 374 (1924).of Limitations
it must show conditions which
overcome the bar of the Statute
first instance, or actual public
would have enabled it to condemn the land in the76,
81 At. 132 (1911).
use. D. L. & W. R. R. v. Tobyhanna, 232 Pa.
. R. v. Town"No. Pac. R. R. v. Smith, 171 U. S. 26o (1898); No. Pac.
197 U. S. x (19o4). See
send, i90 U. S. 267 (1902) ; No. Pac. R. I. v. Ely,
also 12 MICH. L REv. 300 (1914).
"See No. Pac. R. R. v. Townsend, supra, note 13, p. 27 .
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15
There is also
right of way is exempted from limitation by statute.
an easement,
only
is
railroad
the
of
a distinction where the interest
the general rule being that occupation of the land by the owner of
the servient estate is presumed permissive.?' But where the railroad
owns the fee, the great weight of authority is opposed to the Penn7
sylvania rule, holding, that title to the right of way may be acquired
by adverse possession," and this applies as well to a canal as to a rail-

road."9

It may be true that railroad officials have a greater financial interest in checking encroacunents on railroad property than is the
case with city authorities and public interests in city streets, so that
since
the latter should be protected and not the former. Nevertheless,
0
several states have exempted the railroads by legislation," it will be
of interest to note whether this presages a swing over to railroad protection, just as the tendency has been to relieve municipalities from
the bar of the Statutes of Limitations 21 as to their streets and high-

ways.

P.L.I.

CHANGES IN PROCEDURAL LAW AS Ex POST FACTO LEGISLATION
-The phrase cx post facto law, taken in its literal meaning of a law

passed after the act has been done, is comprehensive enough in its
scope to embrace all retrospective laws, both civil and criminal.' It
has been firmly established, however, that the term as used in the
Constitution is applicable only to legislation punishing as criminal
acts done before it became effective.3 The constitutional inhibition

" Maney v. R. R. Co., 161 Mass. 283, 37 N. E. 164 (1894); Amee v. B. &
A. R R., 212 Mass. 421, 99 N. E. 168 (1912); Powell v. Atchison, 15 Mio.
W. 312 (1903) ;
339, 114 S. W. io67 (19o8) ; Lucas v. Ry., 67 Neb. 603, 97 N.
v. R. R,
Costello v. G. T. R. Co., 7o N. H. 403, 47 Ad. 265 (x9o) ; Purifoy
S.
108 N. C. 100, 12 S. E. 741 (1891); May v. A. C. L Co., 15' N. C 38,66
The VerF. 310 (19o9); Bacon v. B. R. Co., 83 Vt. 421, -6 Ad. 74228Vt.(igo).
343, 52 Ad. 957
mont statute is constitutional. Dronin v. B. R. Co.,
(1902).

" U. P. R. R. v. Kindred, 43 Kan. 134, 23 Pac. 112 (1890); Ala. G; S.
R. R. v. McWhorten, 202 Ala. 455, &o So. 839 (1919). Contra: Donahue v.
R. R., 165 I11.640, 46 N. E. 714 (1897) ; R. R. v. Holton, i0 Ky. 665, 39 S. W.27- (1897); Matthcws v. R. R., jio Mich. 27o, 64 N. W. ixi (i896).
Supra, note 12.
Alex. City Co. v. R. R., 182 Ala. 516, 62 So. 745 (1913) ; Northern R. R.
v. Demarest, 94 N. J. L. 68, io8 Ad. 376 (2929); Dulin v. 0. R. R. R., 73 W.
Va. i6o, 8o S. E. 145 (1913). See also 2 VA. L. REv. 599 (1915).
" Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Great Falls Power Co., supra, note 8.
-Supra, note is.
S. E.
' Supra, notes 4 and 5. Cf. Ralston v. Weston, 46 'V. Va. 544, 33
326 (1899).
.STORY,
COaMENTARaIS oN Tn CONSTITUTION, (sth ed., Bigelow, x89i)
22
219.

'Constitution of the United States, Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3, and sec. xo, cl. i.
'Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S, 1798).
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was thus limited in the first decision of the United States Supreme
Court on this subject,' in which Mr. Justice Chase judicially interpreted an ex post facto law within the meaning of the Constitution as
follows:
"i. Every law that makes an action done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was when committed. 3. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater pdnishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed. 4. Every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender."
enunciation there was some dissent to
Although at the time of its
5
the constitutional provisions governthat
forth,
set
thus
principle
the
ing cx post facto laws in their scope and purpose were confined to
laws respecting criminal punishments and bore no relation whatever
to retrospective legislation of any other description, and while the
definition has been stated differently and in more liberal terms, the
classification has been consistently adhered to by federal and state
courts alike. r The conflict, where any occurs, is in the application of
these rules to the facts of individual cases.
The intention and purpose of the Constitutional Convention in
prohibiting cx post facto laws being to protect the individual rights
of life and liberty against harsh and oppressive retrospective legislation, 8 it would seem to follow that every retrospective penal or
criminal statute is not necessarily ex post facto. Courts are generally
agreed in finding that a statute which clearly increases the punishment prescribed at the time when an act vas done is cx post facto as
to that act; and the authorities are likewise in accord in declaring
that a law is not within the constitutional prohibition where, instead
of creating or aggravating the crime, or adding to the punishment,
or substantially altering the rules of evidence or procedure, it mitiIbid.

'Johnson, J., in note to Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters 8cr, 414 (U. S.,
1829, 3d ed., 1883).

'"An cx post facto law is one which, in its operation makes that criminal
inor penal, which was not so at the, time the action was performed; or which
or its
creases the punishment; or, in short, which, in relation to the offense, States
conse Juences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." United
v. Hall, Fed. Cas. No. 15,285, (C. C., 18o9).
'Gibson v. Mississippi, x62 U. S. 565 (1895); Commonwealth v. Lewis,
o).
6 Binn. 266 (Pa., 1814); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518 (
,See Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. i8o, 483 (1915).

'A statute is ex post facto which adds a fine to the punishment by niprisonm,.'nt, imposcd by the law in force when the offense was committed.
State v. McDonald, 2o Minn. 136 0873).
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10 Difficult practical problems often arise
gates the rigor of the law.
does or does
particular statutory change
a
in determining whether
1
not amount to a mitigation of the rigor of the law."
The object of the constitutional provision was to protect substan2
tial personal rights against oppressive retroactive legislation 2 and
not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance; 1S hence the inhibition
against ex post facto laws does not apply to alterations in details of
procedure,"' which affect only the manner in which a crime may be
15
proved and do not in any way determine the act done or its effect.
who
person
guilty
a
of
Such a change may result in the conviction
would otherwise remain unpunished, but not in the conviction of a
man before innocent nor in an increase in punishment. Thus laws
changing the number of peremptory challenges allowed the accused
testify,"'
or the prosecution," increasing the class of persons who may
accesan
as
indicted
been
have
must
before
who
one
providing that
sory, but punished as if a principal, may be indicted for the crime
conitself,"' or removing the qualifications of witnesses so that atestify
to
wife
a
allowing
or
witness,'
victed felon is a competent
1
against her husband, have been held not ex post facto as to offenses
committed before their passage. Changes of this nature affect only
the manner of proving a fact which is already an element of the crime
charged, and so do not alter the degree or lessen the amount of proof
necessary for conviction when the act was done. In such case the
nature of the offense, its constituent elements, the amount of proof
necessary and the subsequent punishment remain the same and are
not altered by the statute.
A procedural change, however, which allows substantially different evidence to convict or which operates to deprive the offender of

Commonwealth
I Commonwealth v. Kalch, 239 Pa. 533, 87 At. 61 (1913);
14o N. Y. 484, 35 N. E.
21 Pick. 492 (Mass., 1839); People v. Hayes,
951 (1894).
minimum
' Thus a change in the law authorizing a shorter maximum ormitigation;
in
one
is
law
former
the
under
authorized
that
than
imprisonment
the maximum and inPeople v. Hayes, supra, note io; but a statute reducing
the effect of the
creasing the minimum was held to be ex post facto, although
be punished, and
decision was to leave no law by which the defendant could
People, 6
he was discharged though found guilty of the offense. Garvey v.
Colo. 559, 3 Pac. 9o3 (883).
" See Malloy v. South Carolina, supra, note &
' See Gibson v. Mississippi, supra, note 7, P. 590; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 597 (190).
"Frisby v. United States, 38 D. C. App. 22 (1912).
v. Mott.

U I WIGUORE, EVIDENCE, 22 (1904).

" Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45 (186o).
" Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884).
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 32o, 68 N. E. 346 (1903).
Hopt v. Utah, supra, note 17.
"Webster v. State, 142 Ala. 56, 38 So. ioo (i9o5).
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at the time of the coma defense available under the laws in force on
acts previously comeffect
no
have
can
offense
mission of his
when the act was
existing
laws
the
by
mitted, which must be judged
character,
arbitrary
and
harsh
done, ' for such a change, due to its
v. .tssosri, the
Kring
In
prohibition.
falls within the constitutional
murder in the second degree and
defendant entered a plea of guilty of law of Missouri in force when
the
sentence was pronounced. Under was an acquittal of the crime of
the homicide was committed -this
prisoner's appeal, the sentence
murder in the first degree. On the reversed and set aside. After
pronounced on his plea of guilty wasguilty of murder in the second
the homicide but before the plea of
was changed, so that by force
degree was entered, the law of Missouri
the plea of guilty be lawfully
on
of the new provisions if a judgment an acquittal of the higher crime.
set aside, it shall not be held to be
held the new law to be ex post
The United States Supreme Court of no effect. Here a substanfacto as to the homicide and therefore since the new law operated to
tial right of the accused was impaired, law when the homicide was
the
deny him a defense available under
committed.
was
retroctiv
operating
The question of a procedural change,
v.
Chtf
Bea.ell v. Ohio a
involved in the recent cases of
emof
crime
the
time
law of Ohio, at the

Ohio." In these cases the
pro-ided:
bezzlement, a felony, was committed,
indicted for a felony,
"'When two or more persons are jointly each shall be seppurpose,
on application to the court for that
arately tried." "
the law was amended to
After the act, but prior to the indictment,
provide:
indicted for a felony,
"When two or more persons are jointly jointly, unless the
tried
be
shall
they
except a capital offense,
therefor by the prosCourt for good cause shown, on application
order that
defendants,
said
of
more
or
ecuting attorney or one
separately.""
one or more of said defendants be tried
to offenses committed before
This amended Act was made applicable for separate trials, and upon
moved
the amendment. The defendants
and conviction of the deboth motions being denied, the joint trial
States Supreme Court
United
the
to
fendants followed. In an appeal
whether this was an ex post
the constitutional question was raised
that it was not.
held
facto law and the Supreme Court
= Calder v. Bull, supra, note 3.
1o7 U. S. 221 (88).
"4S Sup. Ct 68 (192).

"Ibid.
-

Ohio Gen. Code, § 13,677.
io Ohio Laws 301.
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In these cases the law in question restored a mode of trial deemed
appropriate at common law, with discretionary power in the court
to direct separate trials. The change was merely one in the mode
of trial which did not alter the nature of the crime or its constituent
elements, or the nature and amount of evidence necessary to prove the
charge nor did it add to the punishment, and since the accused were
denied no substantial personal rights by the statute, retrospective
though it was, the cases seem correctly decided on principle as well
as authority.

C. W. K., Jr.

THE NATURE OF RIGHTS I-; A DEAD BODY-The disposition of
a human body after death usually follows the desires of the deceased
as expressed while living, to be carried out by his relatives or friends.
Although, even in the absence of expressions of such desires, disputes
seldom occur, yet, when the question arises, it is one not easily to be
determined by any tribunal.
1
At common law there were no property rights in a corpse. Thus,
2
while it was larceny to take the winding sheet from a dead body, it
was not a felony to steal the body itself.' It is doubtful whether a
4
person could dispose of his own body by will, nor could a corpse be
disposed of for anatomical purposes.5 Not only were there no property rights, but there are indications that even the relatives' rights
to the possession of the dead body for the purposes of burial have
not always been adequately protected." Certainly, in the Middle
Ages a corpse could be arrested by a creditor for a debt due from
the deceased, thus preventing proper burial by the relatives,T and the
12 BLACKSTONE, COmmEXT.AUESo 429. Rex v. Lynn, 2 T. R. 733 (Eng.,
37S8); Foster v. Dodd, 8 Best & Smith 842 (Eng., 1867); Griffith v. R. R,
23 S. C. 25 (1884).
'Haynes' Case, 12 Coke 113 (Eng., 1614).
"Reg. v. Handyside, 2 East P. & C. 652 (Eng., 18o3). But the unauthorized removal of a corpse was a misdemeanor. Reg. v. Sharpe, 7 Cox C. C.
214 (Eng., 1857).
'In Williams v. Williams, L R_ 2o Ch. D. 659 (Eng., 1882), the opinion
was expressed that a man cannot dispose of his body by will because there is
no property in a dead body. The decision has been criticized in -England; 17
LAW. J. 149 (1882) ; and in this country; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313,
56 At. 878 (i9o4); but was approved in Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac.
i;o (igoo). However, directions in wills for the disposition of the testator's
bcdy have been respected from time immemorial. Frank W. Grinnell, Legal
In one case it
Rights in the Remains of the Deid. 17 GREEN- BAG 345 (19o5).
was said that a desire expressed in a will is imperative, and the body must be
disposed of accordingly. Cooney v. English, 86 Misc. 2-92, 148 N. Y. Supp. 285
(1914)-

a o CE.T. L. J. 325 (i88o).

. See 9 SOL J. 3 (1864), for instances of withholding corpses from relatives
for purposes of ransom.
'Supra, note 5.

NOTES
practice appears to have existed in this country as late as x8x0
This doctrine, that there could be no property in a dead body, -seems
to have had its origin in a dictum of Lord Coke, where, in asserting
the authority of the Church, he says, "It is to be observed that .in
every sepulchre that hath a monument two things are to be considered, viz., the monument, and the sepulture or burial of the dead.
The burial of the cadaver, that is caro dato vcrmibus, is nullius ix
bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance . . . " If the doctrine rests on Lord Coke's etymology of the word "cadaver," its
10
correctness is to be doubted, but it is to be observed that it is asserted merely that the burial is nullius in bonis, which was legally true
at the time, since the whole matter was cognizable only in the ecclesiastical courts."'
The common law doctrine- has rarely been adhered to in this
country. It has been recognized that there are certain definite rights
relating to the custody and disposal of the remains of the dead, and
that they are in the nature of property rights. This doctrine, if not
originating in, was at least given definite form in1 the report of the
referee in the. Case of Widening Beekman Street,' in which one of
the conclusions was that the right to bury a corpse and preserve its
remains is a legal right which the courts will recognize and protect.
The report w-as afterwards adopted by the court, and although it has
been bitterly opposed,13 it has received recognition in many jurisdictions."
Undoubtedly there are certain duties imposed on the living to
care for and to bury the bodies of the deceased.$ It has repeatedly
been said that the rights of the living arise from these obligations,
but this theory has been criticized as fallacious and unnecessarily
'See Mass. Act of 18it, Gen. Laws (1921) C.27,270, prohibiting the taking of a dead body on an execution or attachment.
93 INsTrrurus

203 (1797).

'The Widening of Beckman Street, 4 Brad. Surr. So3 (N. Y., 1857).
"Ibid; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 5o N. NV. 238 (1891).
Supra, note 10.
"R. S. Guernsey, in an article, The Ouaiership of a Corpse Before BuiaL,
10 CENT. L. J. 303 (x88o), asserts it to be an obiter opinion, full of errors of
1

law and fact, and opposed to the long line of decisions which hold that there is

no property in a corpse.
"Larson v. Chase, supra, note ii; Page v. Symonds, 63 N. H. 17 (1883);
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, ,o R. I. 227 (x872).
wife
"It is the duty of the husband to bury the deceased wife, and of the1788);
to bury the deceased husband; Jenkins v. Tucker, i I-L Bl. go (Eng.,
a parent to
Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538 (1868); it is the du'y of1851);
and a
bury his deceased child; Reg. v. Vann, 2 Den. C. C. 325 (Eng.,
duty is imposed on a householder to bury the body of a pauper who has died
under his roof, Reg. v. Stewart, 12 A. & E. 773 (Eng., i84o).
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note 4.
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'Fox v. Gordon, i6 Phila. i85 (Pa., 1883).

0 Larson v. Chase, supra, note ii.
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NOTES.

The custodian's rights are definite, but they cannot be said to
be absolute. They must yield when in conflict with the public good,"
or when the demands of justice require such subordination.' Although opinions have been expressed by some courts and a number
of text-writers that the rights are paramount s in certain individuals,"
it seems, as pointed out in a recent decision,2 that no such universal
rule can be laid down. The proper custodian should be determined
by a broad inquiry into the circumstances of each case, "an inquiry
having due regard to the interest of the public, the wishes of the decedent, and the rights and feelings of those entitled to be heard by
reason of relationship or association," ' and guided by such rules as
those formulated in the case of Pettigrew v. Pettigrew:"

i. The paramount right is in the surviving husband or widow,
and if the parties were living in. the normal relations of marriage it
will require a very strong case to justify a court in interfering with
the wish of the survivor.
2. If there is no surviving husband or wife, the right is in the
next of kin in the order of their relation to the decedent, modified it
may be by circumstances of special intimacy or association with the
decedent.
3. How far the desires of the decedent should prevail against
those of the surviving husband or wife is an open question, but as
against remoter connections, such wishes especially if strongly-and
recently expressed, should prevail
This doctrine seems to give the best method of approach to a settlement of disputes of such a delicate character, involving as they do.
the demands of society, the feelings and wishes of the living, and
due regard to the desires of the deceased.
J. F. H.

As during the influenza epidemic of txig-i91g.
"G.ay v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. g0, i24 S. W. 63S (z9o8).
"A number of courts and text-writers have held that the paramount right
is in the next of kin: Case of Widening Beckman Street, supra, note to; Reenhan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N. E. 822 (x8go); Lowrie v. Plitt, ix Philo.
303 (1876); Smiley v. Bartlett, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 234 (1892). Mr. Moak in a
note to Re Bettison, 12 Eng. Rep. 656 (Eng., 1874), concludes that upon principle in a contest between the widow and the heir, the right to select and control the place of burial should belong to the heir. An opposing opinion is expressed by John F. Baker in to ALBANY L J. 70 (1874).
Barder v. Barder, 6 Pa. D. & C. 720 (i925).
Pettigrew v. *Pettigrew, supra, note 4.
Ibid.

